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ABSTRACT Religious traditions have always played a central role in supporting those
experiencing poverty, through service delivery as well as the provision of spiritual resources
that provide mechanisms for resilience at both the individual and community level. However,
the fact that religions can be seen to support social structures and practices that contribute
towards inequality and conﬂict, also underscores a role for religious traditions in creating
conditions of poverty. While the Western-led modern global development institutions that
have emerged since the Second World War have tended to be secular in nature, over the past
decade or so there has been an apparent ‘turn to religion’ by these global development
institutions, as well as in academic development studies. This reﬂects the realization that
modernization and secularization do not necessarily go together, and that religious values
and faith actors are important determinants in the drive to reduce poverty, as well as in
structures and practices that underpin it. This paper traces three phases of engagement
between religions and global development institutions. In phase one, the ‘pre-secular’ or the
‘integrated phase’ seen during the colonial era, religion and poverty reduction were intimately
entwined, with the contemporary global development project being a legacy of this. The
second phase is the ‘secular’ or the ‘fragmented’ phase, and relates to the era of the global
development industry, which is founded on the normative secularist position that moder-
nization will and indeed should lead to secularization. The third phase is characterized by the
‘turn to religion’ from the early 2000s. Drawing the three phases together and reﬂecting on
the nature of the dynamics within the third phase, the ‘turn to religion’, this paper is
underpinned by two main questions. First, what does this mean for the apparent processes of
secularization? Is this evidence that they are being reversed and that we are witnessing the
emergence of the ‘desecularization of development’ or of a ‘post-secular development
praxis’? Second, to what extent are FBOs working in development to be deﬁned as neo-
liberalism’s ‘little platoons’—shaped by and instrumentalized to the service of secular neo-
liberal social, political and economic systems, or do we need to develop a more sophisticated
account that can contribute towards better policy and practice around poverty reduction?
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Introduction1
Religious traditions have always played a central role insupporting those experiencing poverty, through servicedelivery as well as the provision of spiritual resources that
provide mechanisms for resilience at both the individual and
community level. Sometimes this involves those motivated by
their religion helping other members of their own religious
community, but religious practitioners also often extend their
support to those from other religions. This has been particularly
marked within Christian traditions that aim to gain converts, a
phenomenon extending back to various colonial missionary
encounters (Manji and O’Coill, 2002; Deacon and Tomalin, 2015;
Haustein and Tomalin, 2017). Moreover, the fact that religions
can be seen to support social structures and practices that con-
tribute towards inequality and conﬂict, also underscores a role for
religious traditions in creating conditions of poverty (Tomalin,
2013).
The complex ways that religions intersect with poverty has
meant that, for the secular global development institutions that
have emerged since the end of World War II, religions (in terms
of their values and institutions) have proved to be troublesome
bedfellows. This is despite obvious areas of shared interest and
concern between such institutions and, as I will argue, despite the
roots of Western-led global development institutions in the
Christian missionary era, which have now been forgotten (Dea-
con and Tomalin, 2015; Haustein and Tomalin, 2017). While this
modern global development industry has tended to be secular in
nature and to pay little attention to people’s religious values and
identities, over the past decade or so there has been an apparent
‘turn to religion’ by global development institutions, as well as in
academic development studies (Rakodi, 2015). This reﬂects the
realization that modernization and secularization do not neces-
sarily go together, and that religious values and faith actors are
important determinants in the drive to reduce poverty, as well as
in structures and practices that underpin it.
Since the early 2000s there has been a marked increase in
interest from secular global development institutions, including
development donors and NGOs, in funding and working with
faith actors around poverty reduction. Key global poverty
reduction initiatives such as the UN Millennium Development
Goals, which ran from 2000–2015, increasingly drew faith actors
into their activities and faith-based organizations (FBOs) couched
their work in terms of these shared global goals. More recently the
new UN Sustainable Development Goals (2015–2030), which
were arrived at following the largest public consultation ever held
in the UN’s history, have involved faith actors more closely
throughout the whole process, including in the ﬁnal discussions
in New York about what the goals and the sub-goals would
consist of (Dodds et al., 2017; Tomalin et al., 2017, 2018).2
The main signiﬁcance of this paper is that it brings together a
discussion of this ‘turn to religion’ with theories from the
sociology of religion to better understand the nature of the cur-
rent engagement between religions and global development
institutions, and the implications that this has for poverty
reduction and other development and humanitarian initiatives.3
My focus is original in that it will not concern the way that
different religious traditions might approach development and
humanitarian activities, but rather the extent to which they are
part of a conversation and ﬁeld of practice that enables them to
join their efforts with those of global development and humani-
tarian actors in the ﬁrst place. To better understand the nature of
this engagement between religions and global development
institutions, I offer an original analysis that traces three phases of
religion-development engagement. These are not clear-cut phases,
and there is overlap between them. However, they are analytically
signiﬁcant as they enable us to identify the shifting engagement
between religions and global development institutions over time,
and to make visible the religious roots of the contemporary
secular Western development project. In phase one, which I call
the ‘pre-secular’ or the ‘integrated phase’ seen during the colonial
era, religion and poverty reduction were intimately entwined,
with the contemporary global development project being a legacy
of this, and therefore having religious roots that are now
obscured. I am not suggesting that this was itself a ‘pre-secular’
era, since secularizing processes were well underway by the
colonial era, and were already shaping modernity. However,
during the colonial era faith actors had a more central and
recognized role to play in social welfare and poverty reduction in
contrast to the role they have played since the mid-20th century.
Moreover, the post-Second World War period marks a key phase
in the rise of secularism in the Global North, and a lessening of
the hold that religious values and sources of authority have upon
individuals and the state. It was at this time that theories of
secularization in sociology began to take hold, with both a
descriptive and normative function (Berger, 1967). It must also be
noted that religious traditions played a role in shaping under-
standings of development and providing welfare support in pre-
colonial settings. However, my aim in this paper is to understand
the different phases of engagement between religions and global
development institutions and discourses, with the latter having
their roots in the colonial era.
The second phase, which I am calling the ‘secular’ or the
‘fragmented’ phase, relates to the era of the global development
industry which has been founded on a normative secularist
position that modernization will and indeed should lead to
secularization. This has marginalized the signiﬁcant role that
diverse religious traditions have continued to play in local level
development globally as well as forgetting the roots of Western-
led global development in the colonial missionary era. The third
phase is characterized by the ‘turn to religion’ from the early
2000s. The so-called global resurgence of religion or revitalization
of religion has led to a greater voice for faith actors in public
development debates and initiatives, and an ‘apparent turn to
religion’ by global development actors (Casanova, 1994; Berger,
1999; Tomalin, 2013). Secular institutions now recognize that
faith actors are there and (some) faith actors have learnt how to
engage with the discourse of development and to situate them-
selves to have an impact.
There has been much celebration in the religion and devel-
opment literature, both academic and practitioner, that faith
actors are now viewed as legitimate development partners, invited
to participate in policy dialogue and in receipt of donor funding
(Clarke and Jennings, 2008; Tomalin, 2013; Clarke, 2013). But
what does this ‘turn to religion’ indicate about apparent processes
of secularization? Is it evidence that they are being reversed and
that we are witnessing the emergence of the ‘desecularization of
development’ or of a ‘post-secular development praxis’? I will
argue that despite the apparent ‘turn to religion’ by global
development institutions in this third phase, there has only been a
limited or partial integration of religious efforts into global
development activities. It cannot therefore be properly under-
stood as evidence for a ‘desecularization of development’ or of a
‘post-secular development praxis’. While global development
institutions are taking religion more seriously, they mainly do this
through partnering with FBOs that look like themselves, and
those FBOs in turn have fashioned themselves to be allowed to
participate in secular global development debates and practice.
This formal4 FBO sector consists of organizations which operate
(at least in their public facing persona) rather like any other
international non-governmental organization, and therefore this
‘turn to religion’ at the level of global development organizations
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misses out much faith-based activity at the local level, including
in places of worship and the congregations of charismatic reli-
gious leaders (Clarke and Jennings, 2008; Deneulin and Banu,
2009). Indeed, some commentators are critical that modern FBOs
comprise little more that ‘neo-liberalism’s little platoons’ (Cloke
et al., 2016). I intend to evaluate whether this a fair assessment, or
if we need to instead develop a more sophisticated account that
can contribute towards better policy and practice regarding
poverty reduction.
While some faith actors prefer to operate on secular terms in
their interactions with global development actors and embrace
this identity (at the same time not viewing themselves as hand-
maids of the neo-liberal consensus), other faith actors are critical
that they are being instrumentalized by global development
institutions to achieve pre-deﬁned goals (that reﬂect a proble-
matic neo-liberal development model) and that do not take the
faith dimensions or the distinct contributions of faith actors
seriously (Deneulin and Banu, 2009). There is no doubt more
than a little truth in this, but I will argue that the situation is more
complex than this portrays it. This paper makes a number of
original contributions, comprising a new way of thinking about
the religion-development ﬁeld that is signiﬁcant for scholars of
religion and development, as well as faith-based and secular
development actors. It will enable them to see what type of
religion-development discourse dominates the religion-
development domain (i.e., that which takes place in interface 1
in Fig. 1), who the main actors are, what or who is being left out
of the interactions, and therefore where activities could usefully
be directed (i.e., towards interface 2 in Fig. 1).
First, what has been missed in studies to date is that interna-
tional FBOs strategically shift in register between secular modes
of communication with global development actors to religious
modes with local faith actors. While international FBOs, such as
Tearfund, Christian Aid or Islamic Relief, are negotiating and
engaging with secular global development institutions to achieve
shared goals such as the MDGs or the new SDGs, they also
connect with and build the capacity of local faith actors in the
Global South, who are disconnected from the global development
industry. They thus act as ‘brokers operating at the “interfaces” of
different world-views and knowledge systems' which 'reveals their
importance in negotiating roles, relationships, and representa-
tions’ (Mosse and Lewis, 2006, p. 10; Long, 2001; Bierschenk
et al., 2002; Tomalin, forthcoming). As such, I argue that to view
them as the ‘little platoons’ of neo-liberalism fails to take account
of this wider and less visible aspect of their engagement in the
religion-development domain. Second, I argue that we need to
view the religion-development domain as going beyond a rather
narrow focus upon the engagement between global development
actors and FBOs, which has tended to capture development
policy, practice and studies so far (i.e., within interface 1 in Fig.
1). There is a realm of development-related activity by and
between local faith actors and communities that is not easily
packaged into the familiar categories of FBO or NGO, and which
does not speak, nor is not readily translatable, into the secular
language of global development discourses (i.e., interface 2 in Fig.
1 and below). For these reasons, this realm is largely hidden from
policy makers, is more difﬁcult to access and research than the
formal visible FBO/NGO sector, yet is likely to have a larger
impact on people’s daily lives in terms of both blocking and
driving social change towards achieving frameworks such as the
SDGs than any inﬂuences from the secular macro level. Third, I
will relate these observations to the theoretical literature and will
offer a distinctive contribution to the sociology of religion. I will
argue that theories of secularization and de-secularization need to
be more nuanced to accommodate multiple co-existing types of
religious-secular dynamics at play in the broader religion-
development domain. The paper brings together existing the-
ories in a novel way and repackages them to make sense of the
religion-development domain.
The pre-secular or integrated phase: ‘commerce and
Christianity’—the religious roots of global development
institutions in the colonial missionary era
The story of global development institutions’ engagement with
religion has parallels with the emergence of the modern welfare
state in Britain. Rana Jawad, in her book on religion and welfare
in Britain, begins her discussion with an examination of the pre-
welfare state era before 1945, arguing that ‘social welfare is a
much broader and older endeavor than the modern welfare state,
with religious values, identities and political mobilization
Secular
Interface 1
(Arrows indicate
direcon of engagement)
Interface 2
Religious
Local faith actors (e.g. local informal FBOs, 
churches, 
congregaons, religious leaders)
Secular global development instuons,
secular states
Formal internaonal FBOs, 
internaonally oriented religious leaders
Fig. 1 Religion-Development Domain. This ﬁgure shows, from top to bottom, the different parts of the religion-development domain, from secular to
increasingly religious, as well as the ‘interfaces’ where secular global development institutions intersect with international FBOs, and international FBOs
intersect with local faith actors
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supplying much of the moral and material resources shaping its
pathway’ (2012, p. 34).
This resembles the main argument being made here, that
modern global development institutions have religious roots that
today are obscured. There are also overlaps between the British
pre-welfare state setting and the pre-global development setting,
in that similar religious discourses and endeavours underpin
each, as Britain was at that time a major colonial and missionary
nation. By the 18th century many of the same individuals, orga-
nizations and Christian denominations feature in both stories,
drawing on the Christian traditions of philanthropy, Liberal
Anglicanism, Evangelicalism and Quakerism, which promoted
social welfare and poverty reduction in Britain and also in the
colonies. This includes members of the so-called Clapham Sect at
the turn of the 18th century, patronized by famous individuals
such as William Wilberforce, the anti-slavery campaigner, to the
later married couple William and Catherine Booth, who founded
the Salvation Army in 1878 (Tomkins, 2010; Howse, 1952; Hat-
tersley, 1999).
This was also the case in colonial settings. European coloni-
alism shifted from a focus on trade to imperial expansion over
almost all of Africa and large parts of Asia in the 19th century,
with Christian missions and advocacy groups playing an
increasingly important role in this expansion, as well as in
responding to the human exploitation it created, thus infusing
‘the emerging imperial colonialism with religious sentiment from
the start’ (Haustein and Tomalin, 2017, p. 77–78). In Africa this
process was rooted in the British anti-slavery movement, a ‘cur-
ious alliance of Enlightenment humanism and evangelical out-
rage’ (Reid, 2012, p. 28; Drescher, 2009, p. 205–241). While the
slave trade was outlawed in 1831 and slave ownership throughout
the Empire in 1833, it was clear by the late 1830s that slave
raiding and trading in Africa had actually increased. A new
generation of anti-slavery advocates took on this cause, adopting
‘commerce and Christianity’ as a new guiding slogan, ‘wrapped in
a providentialist theology about the God-given British mission to
the world’ (Haustein and Tomalin, 2017, p. 78; Stanley, 1983;
Porter, 1985; Follett, 2008). The underpinning aim was that in
establishing ‘legitimate trade’, through a combination of entre-
preneurial and missionary effort, the slave trade would be
undermined and brought to an end. The Clapham Sect member
Thomas Fowell Buxton (1768–1845) provided the founding
manifesto for this idea in his The African Slave Trade and Its
Remedy (1840):
Let missionaries and schoolmasters, the plough and the
spade, go together, and agriculture will ﬂourish; the avenues
to legitimate commerce will be opened; conﬁdence between
man and man will be inspired; whilst civilization will
advance as the natural effect, and Christianity operate as
the proximate cause of this happy change (Buxton, 1840, p.
511).
In Asia the trajectories were similar, although in South Asia the
devastating impact of the Indian Mutiny in 1857 played a decisive
role in the emergence of the close relationship between ‘com-
merce and Christianity’ (Stanley, 1983). Between 1857 and 1858
there was a marked increase in donations to missionary societies
in the UK and in the recruitment of missionaries, where ‘it was
perfectly clear that the road back to imperial prosperity followed
the path of Christian duty, that a Christian government of India
was “the only safe policy”' (Stanley, 1983, p. 87). Where ‘Christian
government was not, however, the only constituent of the Indian
insurance policy: economic development was equally indis-
pensable’ (1983, p. 87). Evangelicals in England supported the
construction of India’s rail network at this time, with an aim to
grow the cotton industry and thereby undercut the slavery-reliant
US cotton farms, as well as to provide a means for the spreading
of Christianity into remote and isolated areas in India. Thus,
‘many Christian observers…yoked together commerce and
Christianity in their remedies for India’s malaise’ (Stanley, 1983,
p. 89).
Regarding this ‘pre-secular phase’ of religion and global
development engagement, two points can be noted. First, in both
the case of Africa and South Asia we can see that ‘religions were
invoked as an ally or even central ideological justiﬁcation for the
colonial “civilising” project’ and, in the colonies, ‘other religions
were judged on their compatibility with this “civilising” project,
which sparked “modernising” movements within some religions,
asserting their reformist potential and compliance with European
social and economic visions’ (Haustein and Tomalin, 2017, p. 81).
Secondly,
religious institutions became key providers of the welfare
services which functioned as crucial indicators of the
‘civilising’ project, providing health care, education, voca-
tional training, as well as local information and advocacy…
[and]…in many ways occupied the same structural position
that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have today
(Haustein and Tomalin, 2017, p. 81; Manji and O’Coill,
2002).
The global institutions that today fund and play a signiﬁcant
role in deﬁning and shaping international development policy
and practice are a legacy of the colonial missionary era. Some
organizations have direct heritage from this era, and have
Christian roots. For instance, while Oxfam has Quaker origins
(Black, 1992) and the Red Cross Calvinist ones (Forsythe, 2005),
others take their starting point and motivation from a belief in the
spread of Western modernity, itself having Christian roots. Lar-
gely, however, these organizations do not recognize or draw
attention to their Christian roots and, as I will argue, the ‘turn to
religion’ by development studies, policy and practice is not a
realization of this Christian heritage. What I am presenting here
is a history of the Christian roots of global development institu-
tions and practices that emerged after the Second World War, but
which had their origins in the colonial period. While other reli-
gious traditions have also helped shaped conceptions of devel-
opment in different settings and in supporting social welfare (and
played a strong role in this respect during pre-colonial, colonial
and post-colonial eras) they are not a focus of this paper.
The secular/fragmented phase of the engagement between
religions and global development institutions
The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the
next phase of engagement between religions and global devel-
opment institutions, in which there was a gradual fragmentation
of these organisations' working relationships into separately
pursued secular and religious development activities. This inclu-
ded, particularly in Western nations, a declining proﬁle for faith
actors in terms of strongly publicly supported and recognized
service provision, where they faced a new social, political and
economic landscape that served to redeﬁne their role both at
home and abroad. Jawad suggests that, in the UK, the war had
‘imposed the most damaging impact on associational life and the
basic infrastructure of the church and British families’ (2012, p.
45). While up to this point the Church had been the main pro-
vider of social services, now this was beyond its capacity, not least
because of the drain that the war had placed on the input of
human resources in the life of the churches (Prochaska,
2006, 2011), which led to the ‘physical destruction of the religious
infrastructure that had supported the day-to-day running of
“practical Christianity”’ (Jawad, 2012, p. 46).
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Despite this, key ﬁgures who played a role in justifying and
setting up the Welfare State in 1948, such as Archbishop William
Temple, did not dissociate the new welfare system from the
Church, arguing that ‘the State is under the Moral Law of God,
and is intended by Him to be an instrument for human welfare’
(Jawad 2012, p. 45). This type of explicit Christian articulation
and conceptualization did, however, all but disappear in the fol-
lowing decades. We can see a similar pattern on the international
stage, where change was also occuring for the churches and their
foreign missions. As with the domestic work that churches were
able to do in Britain, the Second World War had a negative
impact on mainline church missionaries overseas. Moreover, this
was happening in settings where colonialism was waning and the
nature of foreign mission shifting, with indigenous-led churches
and movements for conversion starting to emerge (Keyes, 1999,
p. 94).
Alongside the shifting role of faith actors, social change and
shifts in global political structures meant that the emerging global
institutions that were seeking to help nations recover from the
war, to deal with the demise of colonialism and to resist the
‘threat’ of communism, as well as the organizations they gave rise
to, were increasingly underpinned by a belief that modernization
and secularization would go together. The role of religion at the
level of the state and, increasingly, in public life more widely, was
thought to be on a diminishing trajectory, with the prediction
being made that eventually it would disappear from people’s
private life-worlds as well (Berger, 1967).
However, the lessening of the hold of religion on emerging
global development intuitions was more of a gradual than a
sudden change. For instance, US President Truman’s global
development programme, announced in his second inaugural
address of 1949, which is often taken to mark the beginnings of
the global development industry, still included a fair amount of
religious sentiment. In this speech, he outlined his ‘bold new
program…for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped
areas’, echoing the earlier colonial rhetoric and structures of the
‘civilizing’ mission, while at the same time framing this in a
modernist language of prosperity, based on scientiﬁc and eco-
nomic rationality in the name of human progress (Haustein and
Tomalin 2017: 82). However, after spelling this out in modernist
and scientiﬁc language, he then turned to religion, invoking the
Biblical Sermon on the Mount ('Our allies are the millions who
hunger and thirst after righteousness' (Truman, 1949, cf. Matthew
5:6)), one of the two Biblical texts he had rested his hand on when
taking the oath of ofﬁce. Moreover, he closed with:
Steadfast in our faith in the Almighty, we will advance
toward a world where man’s freedom is secure.
To that end we will devote our strength, our resources, and
our ﬁrmness of resolve. With God’s help, the future of
mankind will be assured in a world of justice, harmony, and
peace (Truman, 1949).
Although we should locate his invocation of religion in the
context of American ‘Civil Religion’ (Bellah, 1970), rather than a
straightforward continuation of Victorian Christian sentiment, it
is noteworthy that Truman’s modernism is ‘far removed from a
fully secular development agenda, which did not rest in scientiﬁc
progress alone…[but]…drew heavily on Christian views of social
justice and eschatology’ (Haustein and Tomalin, 2017, p. 82).
While Truman’s speech is often taken as marking the begin-
ning of global development efforts, it was in fact pre-dated by the
setting up of multilateral global development institutions, such as
the Bretton Woods Institutions governing global ﬁnancial pro-
cesses—the IMF and the World Bank (1944)—as well as by the
United Nations (1945). These were the means for delivering the
new development agenda already underway and rehearsed by
Truman in his inaugural speech. However, even here we ﬁnd
vestiges of a religious underpinning. Carette demonstrates that
the UN has a colonial legacy, employs imperialistic discourses
and is built on Judeo-Christian foundations (2017; Carrette and
Miall, 2017). He argues that this Judeo-Christian foundation is
one important reason why there are many more contemporary
Christian FBOs linked to the UN than those from Hinduism or
Buddhism, since there is a ‘hidden Judaic-Christian and Western-
bourgeoise assumption’ shaping the historical ‘secular structures
and discourse of the UN and civil society’ (2017, p. 215; Deacon
and Tomalin, 2015).
While these multilateral institutions comprise the ﬁrst layer of
global development institutions, a second layer is comprised by
the development and humanitarian donor agencies of individual
states (e.g. the USA’s USAID and the UK’s DFID). However,
these are secular institutions that employ scientiﬁc and rationa-
listic logic and approaches to governance and aid provision. A
third layer of global development institutions is located in civil
society and includes the NGO sector. It is here that we also ﬁnd
NGOs that have a faith basis, which have become more powerful
voices in civil society in the last couple of decades. Since the 1980s
we have seen a growth in global civil society and a rise in NGOs
and other community-based organizations which increasingly
play a role in this broader development bricolage, as resistance
against the contradictions in the mainstream development model
but also as facilitators of it through engagement in the UN, for
instance, as well as being in receipt of funds from donors for
which they are accountable. The ﬁnal layer is the private sector,
where businesses or foundations set up from the proﬁts of busi-
nesses are increasingly becoming funders of development and
facilitators of poverty reduction.
By the 1980s a critique began to appear of the marginalization
of religion in development institutions from both faith groups
and academics, reﬂecting broader shifts within the sociology of
religion where the secularization thesis was beginning to be
reappraised (Shiner, 1967; Martin, 1965; Greeley, 2003). The 1980
publication of a special issue of the journal World Development
on the topic of religion bucks the trend. In the introductory
article, Wilber and Jameson, argue that unless approaches to
development are consistent with ‘the inherited moral base of
society’ (1980, p. 468), which is shaped by religion, they are likely
to be ineffective. For them, the ‘moral base of society’ comprises
the collectively agreed-upon value system, which means that a
society can function and reproduce itself over time and, in most
developing countries, they argue, this continues to be shaped by
religion (1980, p. 471). In addition to this discussion about the
importance of religious values and practices in shaping people’s
understandings of what counts as development and how to
achieve poverty reduction, other critics argue that the global
development industry was missing a trick by not engaging sig-
niﬁcantly with faith actors who held trust in their communities,
resources and networks.
Not only was religion largely absent in the programmes of
donors and NGOs, but also within development studies. Ver Beek
carried out a content analysis of the three leading development
studies journals between 1982 and 1998 (see Table 1), ‘ﬁnding
only scant reference to the topics of spirituality or religion’ (2000,
p. 60).
However, if we repeat this analysis for the period 1998–2017
for World Development, the combined ﬁgure for religion/reli-
gious shoots up to 690. This conﬁrms that something has chan-
ged, and that religion is now a serious topic for development
studies, suggesting in turn that it has become more relevant for
development policy and practice at the level of global institutions.
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The 1980s also saw the rise of ‘human development’, with the
ﬁrst human development report launched by the UN in 1990.5
This was inﬂuenced by the Capabilities Approach of Amartya
Sen, which measures development in terms of ‘human cap-
abilities’—the things that people can and cannot do in life—where
an earlier emphasis on economic development was more strongly
accompanied by other measures of wellbeing and development
(Sen, 1990; Nussbaum, 2011; Deneulin and Shahani, 2009;
Tomalin, 2013). Another landmark project that gave rise to a
broader and multidimensional perspective on poverty and under-
development was the World Bank’s Voices of the Poor study,
which ran from the early 1990s to 2000. At the same time, this
research highlighted the important work that faith groups were
doing and that ‘in ratings of effectiveness in both urban and rural
settings, religious organizations feature more prominently than
any single type of state institution’ (Narayan et al., 2000, p. 222;
Tomalin, 2013, p. 46–47).
An emphasis on human development and a broader concep-
tion of how to achieve poverty reduction was clearly reﬂected in
the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): eight interna-
tional development goals that all 192 United Nations member
states and at least 23 international organizations agreed to achieve
by 2015. As the 2000s marched on, we increasingly saw faith
groups responding to the MDGs and global development insti-
tutions courting their input into achieving them. There was a
much stronger message from the global development intuitions
that if the MDGs were to succeed, there needed to be greater
involvement of people and organizations, including those that are
faith-based (Haynes, 2008, p. 38; see also Clarke, 2007, p. 80;
Alkire and Barham, 2005; Boehle, 2010). More recently, the new
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) have attracted the
contribution of faith actors from the start. These are 17 goals that
were established in 2015 following the largest civil society con-
sultation ever held by the UN, and a greater coordinated effort
from within the UN to engage with civil society actors, including
those of faith, as they come into play, including the setting up of
the UN inter-agency task force on engaging faith-based actors for
sustainable development (Karam, 2014, 2016; Dodds et al. 2017).
However, a key question facing faith-based organizations and
other faith actors involved in the SDG consultations, and now in
their interpretation and implementation, is the extent to which
their voices have been incorporated, or whether the SDG fra-
mework is too far removed from the needs of local communities
to reﬂect their interests, including the way that faith shapes
understandings of and approaches to ‘development’. Early ﬁnd-
ings from a current research project ‘Keeping Faith in 2030:
religions and the Sustainable Development GoaIs’ suggest that the
picture is complex and varied, with some faith actors (i.e., reli-
gious minorities in India) viewing the SDGs as a tool to build civil
society and hold the state accountable for providing equitable
services and protecting the rights of the most marginalized, while
others are critical of the fact that their religious identities are
being sidelined within their engagement with the SDGs in
international forums (Tomalin et al., 2017, 2018). I will return to
this latter point below, as it relates to one of the key concerns
underpinning this paper: whether engagement with faith actors
by global development institutions is really evidence of the
‘desecularization of development’ or of the emergence of ‘post-
secular development praxis’, or if it is an instrumentalization of
faith that is being used to serve secular neo-liberal goals.
Even if we are unconvinced that development has become
‘desecularized’, as I will argue below, a predominantly economics-
focused view of development pursued by global development
institutions emerging since the end of the Second World War has
gradually given way to a greater consideration of ‘bottom-up
development’ and ‘human development’, which, although not
completely replacing economic models of development, seeks to
measure and pursue it in terms of a broader set of factors, and to
consult a wider range of individuals. This, I argue, played a role in
paving the way for the ‘turn to religion’, the nature of which is
unpacked in the next section of this paper (Tomalin, 2013, p. 36).
The ‘turn to religion’—‘the desecularization of development’
or ‘post-secular development praxis’?
Rather than disappearing or completely diminishing in sig-
niﬁcance, religion continues to exist alongside modernizing and
globalizing processes, often adapting and even intensifying in
response to changing social, economic and political environ-
ments. Globalization has given rise to the emergence of diverse
styles of religiosity that were not predicted by modernization
theory and, in modern global societies, we ﬁnd religion that is
traditional and conservative as well as that which is modern and
liberal; religion that is institutionalized as well as that which is
not; religion that is publicly inﬂuential as well as that which is
privatized; and ‘religion that is speciﬁcally enacted as religion’ and
other social forms that may have religious functions (Beyer, 2007:
100). Moreover, there are many setting within which religion has
not withered away and died, and continues to play a role
alongside development, nor is it necessarily antithetical to
development and progress in these settings. For example, Pen-
tecostalism and its prosperity gospel suggest a signiﬁcant role for
religion in Latin America and Africa in boosting economic suc-
cess and poverty reduction.
Events such as the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979, the
Satanic Verses controversy in the early 1990s, the inﬂuence of the
Catholic Church on reproductive rights issues, the rise of
nationalist Hindu politics in South Asia, the watershed event of 9/
11, the rise of the religious right in the USA and of ISIS in the
Middle East are but a few of the examples that suggest a revita-
lization of religion or a renewed role for it in political and public
life (Tomalin, 2013, p. 5–8). Debates about the ‘global resurgence
of religion’ have been building momentum since the 1980s, if not
earlier (Thomas, 2005), including those concerning the extent to
which there has been an actual resurgence or whether there has
just been the appearance of one because Western governments
and the media are taking more notice of religions globally. While
this factor is an important one to this debate, there is also con-
crete evidence that, overall, religion has not disappeared in the
way that it was predicted to.
Table 1 Frequency of words relating to the ‘religious’ in development studies journals, 1982–1998 (Ver Beek 2000, p. 68).
Keywords Environment Gender Population Spiritual/ spirituality Religion/ religious
Journals 1982–1998
World Development 83 85 89 0 5
Journal of Development Studies 19 46 38 0 1
Journal of Developing Areas 18 32 43 0 10
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It has been well documented that, over the past decade or so,
there has been a perceptible ‘turn to religion’ by global develop-
ment actors (Clarke and Jennings, 2008; Clarke, 2013; Deneulin
and Banu, 2009). While there is no doubt that global development
institutions increasingly seek to engage with faith actors, in terms
of inviting them to contribute to development debates as well
providing funding, this is not just all on the ‘pull’ side, with faith
actors increasingly being seen to be pushing themselves into
development debates and attempting to inﬂuence policy and
practice. A space appears to have opened in civil society for a
greater participation of (some) faith actors in development, where
secular institutors now recognize that faith actors are there and
(some) faith actors have learnt how to engage with the discourse
of development and to situate themselves so as to have an impact.
However, what does this mean for the apparent processes of
secularization? Is this evidence that they are being reversed and
that we are witnessing the emergence of the ‘desecularization of
development’ or even of a ‘post-secular development praxis’?
While I will argue that something really has changed since the
early 2000s—not least the radical upturn in academic publishing
in this area—in the remainder of this paper I am going to chal-
lenge the idea that this can be viewed as a straightforward
‘desecular’ or ‘post-secular’ turn. Although there has been a ‘turn
to religion’ by global development actors, this has prioritized, and
is underpinned by, a secular world view and secular modes of
communication.
In order to advance my argument, it is necessary to introduce
some nuance into the discussion of the implications of the
resurgence of religion for secularization theory. The failure of
traditional categories of social theory to accommodate con-
temporary global religious forms has given rise to calls for a ‘new
paradigm’ in the sociology of religion (Warner, 1993; Berger,
2014). The sociologist Peter Berger famously revised his position
from one that accepted the inevitability of secularization as a fact
of modernization, which he deﬁned as ‘the process by which
sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination
of religious institutions and symbols’ (Berger, 1967, p. 107). In his
later work, Berger recognized the resurgence and continuing
signiﬁcance of religion as a social and public force, arguing that
‘the world is as furiously religious as it ever was and, in some
places, more so than ever’, and proposed that we are witnessing a
process of the ‘desecularization of the world’ (Berger, 1999, p. 2;
2004). However, I argue that the idea that the revitalization of
religion indicates a wholesale ‘desecularization of the world’, or
even a gradual return to some kind of pre-secular era, is not able
to account for the actual nature of contemporary global religious
forms and the character of the religion-development ﬁeld. The
idea of the move towards a total desecularization masks the fact
that instead of societies and institutions no longer being secular,
what we are faced with is the co-existence of secular discourses
alongside religious discourses, with some places where those
secular discourses are stronger and other places where the reli-
gious has a ﬁrmer inﬂuence. To bring more subtlety into the
debate, drawing upon the work of the sociologist of religion
Casanova, I argue that secularization is multidimensional, con-
sisting of three possible types of secularizing processes: differ-
entiation (i.e., the separation of realms of modern life into distinct
subsystems with their own function and rationality; privatization
(i.e., where religion becomes less signiﬁcant in the public sphere);
and the decline of individual religious belief and afﬁliation.
Casanova’s analysis is focused on the Global North, and he argues
that only one of these types of secularization has been reversed or
has been less intense than we originally thought, namely the
privatization of religion (i.e.,the decreasing public presence and
inﬂuence of religion). He argues that the other types of secular-
ization (differentiation and the decline of individual religious
belief and afﬁliation) have occurred, so talking about desecular-
ization only makes sense with respect to the deprivatization of
religion (Casanova, 1994). However, this analysis is too simplistic,
as it does not take account of the fact that in the Global South the
decline of individual religious belief and afﬁliation has been much
less marked than it has in the Global North, and that religious
authority continues to be a strong force in many people’s lives
there.6 Also, in some settings in the Global South, there has been
a less pronounced and slower rate of privatization of religion than
in others, and to talk about a ‘resurgence of religion’ in the public
sphere makes little sense in settings where it was never in decline.
I suggest that this analysis can be further reﬁned by reﬂecting
upon whether and which type of secularization has occurred at
different interrelated levels of society—the macro, meso and
micro-levels—and to apply this to our analysis of the engagement
between religion and global development actors and institutions.
In terms of sociological analysis, the macro-level refers to national
and global systems, and includes states and multilateral organi-
zations involved in global development policy and practice. The
meso-level is the level of national, regional and international
associations, organizations and movements which play a role in
shaping social, cultural and political concerns. It is the realm of
civil society where NGOs and FBOs inﬂuence and deliver
development processes and outcomes. Finally, the micro-level is
where one ﬁnds the individual, in interaction with others in
families and communities, and includes more proximate local
organizations, including smaller civil society organizations and
places of worship, often playing a key role in development and
humanitarian activities (see Fig. 2).
Macro-level secularization, in the sense of differentiation, has
occurred in many nation states worldwide, particularly in the
Global North, as well as at the level of the broader environment of
global institutions, such as those focusing on development and
global economic processes (see Fig. 2). Even in societies in the
Global South, where this type of secularization has been less
prominent at the macro/state-level, or ‘where religious authority
has been re-exerted over other institutional spheres’ (Mellor and
Shilling, 2014, p. 9), participation ‘in a highly secularized global
institutional environment’ appears to place limits on the suc-
cessful assertion of religious authority at the macro level (Chaves,
1994, p. 766; Mellor and Shilling, 2014, p. 9–10). Accordingly,
global development institutions are part of an overall secular
systemic order and this impacts upon how they interact with
faith-based actors. By contrast, at the meso-level, which is the
level of civil society and the public sphere—the primary domain
of faith-based organizations—secularization in the sense of the
privatization of religion is less pronounced than it was originally
predicted to be in the Global North, and may never have occurred
in the ﬁrst place in the Global South (see Fig. 2). As Mellor and
Shilling argue, ‘this distinction between macro-level structural
differentiation and meso-level religious vitality usefully enables us
to identify distinctive religious trajectories within society and
acknowledge the signiﬁcance of patterns of de-secularization
within certain limits’ (2014, p. 8). Indeed, as Casanova and others
note, macro-level secularization can lead to meso-level depriva-
tization or desecularization, where, for instance, the margin-
alization or rejection of religious voices by secular systems at the
macro-level can lead to a strengthening of faith responses in civil
society as they seek to contest macro-level differentiation/secu-
larization (Casanova, 1994, 2006, 2012). Finally, at the micro-
level, particularly in the Global South, levels of religious authority
are high and there is less evidence of micro-level secularization
than in Global North (see Fig. 2).
I argue that there is a mutually reinforcing and interdependent
dynamic tension and ﬁeld of dialogue between the increasing
prominence of religious voices in the public sphere (especially in
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the Global North where the deprivatization of religion has
occured) pushing out to the macro-level secular institutions, with
those institutions maintaining their secularity yet at the same
time seeking to manage religious pluralism and voices in the
public sphere, at least partly by engaging with them to achieve
their ends. In turn, as Mellor and Shilling note, there is an
‘increasing tendency of many religious organizations to conform
to, or reshape themselves in the light of, distinctively secular
social, cultural or political concerns' (2014, p. 9). This is not
captured by simple theories of secularization or desecularization.
Instead, in discussing the limits of existing theories, it is impor-
tant to be clear which aspect of the secularization thesis has been
reversed and which level of society we are talking about, in order
to account for the co-existence of secular discourses alongside
religious discourses.
It is useful here to look brieﬂy at what we mean by ‘post-
secular’, in order to support my argument that the turn to religion
is not evidence of a straightforward ‘post-secular development
praxis’. This is a term that was brought into the mainstream
through the work of the philosopher and social theorist Jurgen
Habermas (2008, 2006). Dillon tells us that ‘he is not the only one
to use this language, and there has been a tremendous amount of
hairsplitting over what exactly the term means and how it is
related to the secular, secularlisation, secularlism, secularistic and
post-secularism’ (2012, p. 255). The main focus of Habermas’
work has been ‘on the nature of, and complications to, partici-
patory democracy in an increasingly bureaucratic and consumer
society in which the forces of capitalism typically push back
against and triumph over the pull of democratic ideals’ (Dillon
2012, p. 249). Underpinning his thought is a theory of commu-
nicative action, where reasonable deliberation on both sides of a
debate or position can lead to fruitful social action (Habermas,
1995). During the ﬁrst part of his career, he paid no serious
attention to religion and viewed it as a separate realm to the
public sphere, the location where rational debate and commu-
nication could take place. By contrast, religion, being governed by
emotion and irrationality, had no part to play in public debate
that aims to improve societies. However, by the start of the 21st
century, Habermas begins to revise this position and to consider
the role that religion can play in providing a rational critique of
society and therefore sees it as a critical actor in democratic social
change. This revised view was famously articulated in an
encounter between Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (who became Pope
Benedict XVI in 2005) and Habermas in Munich in 2004 (XVI
and Habermas, 2006), building on earlier comments by Haber-
mas in the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy (2001).
For Habermas, the failure of modernity and the contradictions
it creates has given rise to critical public voices that aim to do
something about it, and one of these voices is religion (2001;
Dillon, 2012). His position here is both descriptive and norma-
tive, where he posits that we live in an increasingly post-secular
society, where secular and faith actors need to engage in a
‘complementary learning process’, where ‘both sides can…then
take seriously each other’s contributions to controversial themes
in the public sphere’ (2006: 258). The idea of a ‘complementary
learning process’ seems to respect all forms of knowledge and
allow individuals to share their perspectives in their own voices,
suggesting a level playing ﬁeld between religious and secular
modes of communication. However, Habermas has been widely
criticized for ultimately holding on to a secularist position, which
can be seen through his claim that ‘in a constitutional state, all
norms that can be legally implemented must be formulated and
publicly justiﬁed in a language that all the citizens understand’
(2008, p. 28). As Dillon argues, this amounts to ‘religious citizens’
having to translate ‘their religious norms into a secular idiom’
(2012, p. 258). Habermas does stress that ‘secular citizens can
under certain circumstances learn something from religious
contributions’ (2006, p. 10) and that persons who are neither
willing nor able to divide their moral convictions and their
vocabulary into profane and religious strands must be permitted
to take part in political will formation even if they use religious
language’ (2008, p. 28–29). However, Dillon remains critical that
‘despite this remarkable conciliarity gesture toward religion’
(2012, p. 259) Habermas’ 'core expectation…is that religious
individuals, when they participate in the public sphere or in
public debate, should discard the speciﬁcally religious vocabulary
that penetrates their experiences, worldviews and everyday lan-
guage’ (Dillon 2013, p. 495). This process of ‘communicative
action’ thus necessitates that individuals should engage in secular
rational debate, so religious actors must ensure that their faith-
Diﬀerent types of religious dynamic/change
at diﬀerent levels of society: 
Secular  
Religious Micro-level
Includes in the Global South, local faith actors
(e.g. local informal FBOs, churches, 
congregaons, religious leaders)
Macro-level
Global development instuons
Secular states
Meso-level
Includes formal internaonal FBOs, global civil 
society, 
internaonally oriented 
religious leaders
Macro-level
Secularizaon = diﬀerenaon (impacts 
Global North and South).
Meso-level
Desecularizaon = religious resurgence, 
parcularly in Global North. In Global 
South sengs the secularizaon of civil 
society may never have occurred. 
Micro-level
Religious authority levels 
are high in the Global 
South; less evidence of 
micro-level secularizaon 
than in Global North.
Fig. 2 Desecularization of development? This ﬁgure develops Fig. 1, adding in the three levels (macro, meso and micro) and outlines the extent to which
different types of secularization have occurred at the different levels
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inspired ways of thinking and knowing are translated into secular
rational language and concepts. Here ‘the emotional dimensions
of religion and their intertwining with spirituality and tradition
thus call into question the conceptual viability of the post-secular’
(Dillon, 2012, p. 264–265) as a domain of ‘mutually reasoned
communication’ (2012, p. 264). As Dillon helpfully points out,
Ratzinger himself draws attention to religious-secular and inter-
religious dialogue as ‘not possible without putting one’s faith in
parenthesis’ (2012, p. 264; Donadio, 2008).
In fact, this scenario looks like the engagement I have been
describing between religious actors and global development
institutions, where those working for faith-based organizations
often claim that they ‘leave their faith at the door’ when they
communicate with secular development actors (Clarke, 2007, p.
84), and they do this in order to be able to participate in global
development discourses. While many commentators draw
attention to the fact that increased dialogue between faith and
secular actors is an important part of social debate, and that
improving it would be beneﬁcial, the Habermasian approach
tends to leave out much religious communication and engage-
ment in marginalizing ‘the centrality of spiritualty emotion, and
tradition’ (Dillon, 2012, p. 250).
In both Habermas’ post-secular society and the realm of
engagement between religions and global development institu-
tions that I have been examining in this paper, much about the
lived reality of religious experience and modes of communication
is marginalized (see Fig. 3). There are numerous other things
ocurring that are not captured by this interaction (see interface 1
in Fig. 3) and I therefore question whether this is really a post-
secular interaction as it still prioritizes secular modalities. The
evidence suggests that macro-level institutions in contemporary
global society, including global development institutions, con-
tinue to be secular, while at the meso-level—the public sphere or
civil society—religions play a role that needs to be accounted for
and worked with, and that some faith actors are adapting their
discourse and practice in order to have an impactful place in a
civil society that exists within a macro-level secular social order.
However, this is not a ﬁeld of ‘post-secular development praxis',
nor is the ‘turn to religion’ by global development actors evidence
of the ‘desecularization of development’ per se. First, global
development institutions remain secular, not least by virtue of
ignoring their religious past. The presumption that modern global
development only took shape after the Second World War with
US President Truman’s second inaugural lecture and the setting
up of the Bretton Woods Intuitions, can obscure its colonial and
religious roots. Second, there is evidence that the way that global
institutions engage with faith actors tends to be instrumental, and
that certain modes of religious communication are not facilitated
in this interaction. What about faith actors at the micro-level of
society who are marginalized in global civil society and that have
less of a voice at the macro-level, because of where they are
located geographically, the kind of organization they are and/or
the nature and way they might have of articulating their needs
and views?
This is a pressing area of concern for international FBOs.
While they increasingly have a voice at the macro-level, albeit one
that has been shaped to ﬁt the discourse and practice of secular
global development institutions, they can also shift in register to
connect with local faith actors. This enables them to harness
resources and support activities to facilitate development and
poverty reduction, as well as to be in a position to engage in
dialogue and to act as brokers where local faith actors are gen-
erators of inequality and conﬂict. This is taking on a renewed
saliency in this era of the SDGs, which attracted the contribution
of faith actors from the start. However, in order for the SDGs to
be meaningful for diverse communities in the Global South,
religious modes of communication, not just religious actors, need
to be part of the SDG discourse, since religion plays such a key
role in the factors that support and block the SDGs. If we take
another look at Fig. 3, my argument is that, instead of primarily
focusing attention on ‘interface 1’ (otherwise corresponding with
Habermas’ ‘post-secular’ realm, the realm of engagement between
global development institutions and formal international faith-
based organizations, which, as I have argued, is not convincingly
‘post-secular’), development studies, policy and practice needs to
take more notice of ‘interface 2’ (see Fig. 3). This social and
Secular raonal discourse 
dominates
Interface 1
Interface 2
Religious discourse dominates
Interface 1 coincides with 
Habermas’ post-secular
Macro-level
Meso-level
Interface 2 is
marginalized by
global 
development 
instuonsMicro-level
Fig. 3 Post-secular development praxis? This ﬁgure develops the previous two ﬁgures. It shows that interface 1 coincides with Habermas’ post-secular,
where secular rational discourse dominates, and interface 2 is where religious discourses dominates, but is marginalized by global development institutions
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conceptual space where international FBOs and local faith actors
intersect—or the ‘interface’—has been recognized by anthro-
pologists of development as a site of ‘common interest’, as well as
having the ‘propensity to generate conﬂict due to contradictory
interests and objectives or unequal power relations’ (Long, 2001,
p. 69). This is where global development goals such as the SDGs
become visible to diverse communities in the Global South and,
in order to be achieved, they need to be translated into modes of
communication that include the signiﬁcant role that religious
sources of authority play in people’s personal and private lives.
Conclusion
The main signiﬁcance of this this paper is that it brings together a
discussion of the ‘turn to religion’ by global development insti-
tutions with theories from the sociology of religion to better
understand the actual nature of the current engagement between
religions and global development institutions and the implica-
tions that this has for poverty reduction and other development
and humanitarian initiatives. My focus has not been on the way
that faith traditions approach poverty reduction, but on the
extent to which they are part of a conversation and ﬁeld of
practice that enables them to join efforts with other development
and humanitarian actors to participate in this in the ﬁrst place. I
offered an original analysis in tracing three phases of religion-
development engagement. First, I drew attention to a ‘pre-secular’
phase of the engagement between religions and global develop-
ment institutions, where there was a greater integration between
the work of faith actors and development efforts. Second, I
demonstrated that the emergence of the global development
industry from the end of the Second World War rested upon a
separation of religion from the development activities of global
institutions, despite their religious roots. Third, I examined the
‘turn to religion’ by global development institutions and, with
reference to social theories in the study of religion, I argued that
this turn is not evidence of the desecularization of development or
the emergence of post-secular development praxis, not least
because the secular global development institutions do not
recognize or draw attention to their Christian roots, and they only
engage with faith actors that look like them.
Instead, global development institutions maintain their secu-
larity through engagement with faith actors who have in turn
secularized their discourses to become legitimate global devel-
opment actors. While we could argue that this is problematic for
instrumentalizing religions to serve neo-liberal development
goals, the situation is more complex and interesting than this. I
argue that the realm of communicative action between religions
and global development institutions that has strengthened since
the ‘turn to religion’ from the early 2000s is only one vector in a
global development praxis. Just as interesting and signiﬁcant is
the engagement between these newly empowered and enabled
religious development actors, who are increasingly funded and
promoted by the secular institutions that they engage with, yet
can move between the world of secular rational global develop-
ment at the macro level, and that of local faith communities and
identities and the micro-level. The interaction they have had with
global development institutions has strengthened their role as
civil society actors at the meso-level, as well as their capacity to
use religious modes of communication to engage with local faith
actors that cannot participate in these global development dis-
courses and practices. They are ‘brokers of development’ in the
sense of ‘intermediaries who take advantage of the position at the
interface between two social and cultural conﬁgurations’ (Bier-
schenk et al., 2002, p. 9; Tomalin, forthcoming). In this regard, I
argue that faith-based development organizations are more than
neo-liberalism's ‘little platoons’ and, in this paper, I have
developed a more sophisticated account that can contribute
towards better policy and practice concerning poverty reduction
(Cloke et al., 2016; Hackworth, 2012).
This paper has made a number of original contributions,
comprising a new way of thinking about the religion-
development ﬁeld (see Fig. 1). First, what has been missed in
studies to date is that international FBOs strategically shift in
register between secular modes of communication with global
development actors to religious modes with local faith actors.
That these FBOs do not just have one mode of communication,
but instead can operate using different modalities, is important
for both faith actors and global development actors to recognize
so that they can forge effective alliances on relevant issues and
collaborate with marginalized communities to improve their
social, political and economic inclusion. While international
FBOs, such as Tearfund, World Vision, Christian Aid or Islamic
Relief, are negotiating and engaging with secular global devel-
opment institutions to achieve shared goals such as the MDGs or
the new SDGs, they also endeavour to connect with and build the
capacity of local faith actors in the Global South who are dis-
connected from the global development industry and who may
not give same priority to all elements of the SDGs or even know
about them. Second, I have argued that although local develop-
ment institutions tend to think they have taken religion into
account if they bring international FBOs to the table (‘interface 1’
in Fig. 3), this misses much religious activity at the local level,
where religious modes of communication are widespread and
sources of religious authority highly inﬂuential. In order to
broaden our understanding of the religion-development domain,
I suggest that greater attention needs to be paid to understanding
‘interface 2’, where international FBOs engage with local faith
actors in order to facilitate poverty reduction and sensitization to
development frameworks such as the SDGs. Not dealt with in this
paper is the very important observation that this ‘interface 2’ is
not just a domain where the ideas of secular global development
are simply passed down to local communities in culturally
appropriate ways, but also a domain where alternative approaches
to development and progress are being debated and negotiated,
albeit in the shadow of secular frameworks such as the SDGs
(Mosse and Lewis, 2006).
The third and ﬁnal contribution of this paper has been to relate
these observations to the theoretical literature in the sociology of
religion. As I have argued, the failure of traditional categories of
social theory to accommodate contemporary global religious
forms requires a ‘new paradigm’ in the sociology of religion
(Warner, 1993; Berger, 2014). The paper does not offer a new
theory or ‘new paradigm’, but brings together existing theories in
a novel way, repackaging them to make sense of the religion-
development domain. I have argued that theories of secularization
and de-secularization need to be more nuanced to accommodate
multiple co-existing types of religious-secular dynamics at play in
the broader religion-development domain. Macro level social
theory is useful for making us aware of the global social structures
that play a role in shaping activities at the meso and micro-levels,
including those relating to religions and development. However,
our analysis should not let macro-level structures over-determine
the possibilities that we might imagine are possible at other levels
of society. While macro-level differentiation limits the way that
global development institutions can engage with faith actors and
places limits on the way that faith actors articulate their public
engagement, at the meso- and micro-levels of society religious
actors can interact on their own terms (albeit within an overall
global secular social order). It should be noted, though, that
‘interface 2’ is a ﬁeld that we, as researchers, know less about than
the interaction between religions and development at the level of
global institutions—‘interface 1’ (see Fig. 3). This is where
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research has tended to be focused, and were policy interventions
have been directed. While the ﬁeld of religions and development
studies is still emerging, it now needs to move to this next stage of
increased focus on local faith actors whose activities relating to
poverty reduction are removed from direct engagement with
global development institutions. This is harder research to
undertake, and is likely to do little to simplify our search for
coherent theories to account for the impact of religious dynamics
globally.
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Notes
1 This paper is a revised version of the author’s Professorial Inaugural Lecture delivered
at the University of Leeds, UK, on 30 November 2017.
2 See http://religions-and-development.leeds.ac.uk for details on a research network -
‘Keeping Faith in 2030: religions and the Sustainable Development GoaIs’—that aims
to enhance international and cross-sectional exchange about the role of religions in
deﬁning, implementing, and safeguarding sustainable development, as codiﬁed in the
SDGs. Accessed 24/10/18.
3 The research that informs the discussion in this paper comprises over a decade of work
on religions and development, including research projects, and attendance at
numerous academic and practitioner events. Accessed 24/10/18.
4 The distinction between formal and informal FBOs relates to whether or not the
organization is formally registered under charity legislation or if it is instead an
informal organization.
5 http://hdr.undp.org/en/global-reports
6 It is important to note here that the conclusion about declining religious belief and
practice as having taken place, or what we today call the increase in the number of
‘nones’, is actually more complicated. The rise of the ‘nones’ has been mainly in the
Global North, with the USA rising more slowly than Europe, However, it is predicted
that ‘in the coming decades, the global share of religiously unafﬁliated people is
actually expected to fall’ as the overall continuing growth in ‘nones’ is overtaken by the
rate of growth of religious groups globally (Lipka and McClendone, 2017). The
increasing popularity of religion in China is major factor in this prediction.
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